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This paper analyses the current Flemish afforestation policy and shows that this policy is 
likely to be non-optimal and can be improved. An important step in improving the 
afforestation policy in Flanders is the selection of the optimal location of a cluster of new 
forests as a whole. The analysis of the optimal location can provide the regulator with 
objective criteria, which can be used to develop optimal regulations. It is also worthwhile 
to consider alternative policies, such as auctions for afforestations projects. To this effect, 
we investigate several policy options and test these in a real-life example for the creation 
of new forests in East Flanders. 
 
Keywords: Afforestation / policy instruments / optimal location 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The increase in environmental awareness over the past decades has put environmental 
policy issues onto the agenda of every government. One of these topics is the expansion of 
the forested area in Europe. In the European Union and its member states several 
programs have been developed to stimulate private and public afforestation.  
This paper analyses the afforestation policy currently implemented by the Flemish 
regional government
2 and suggests more efficient alternatives. The current policy is 
mainly based on three pillars: the acquisition of land by the Flemish government, the 
acquisition of land by local authorities (e.g. city councils), and subsidies for private 
landowners (mainly farmers). However, this policy is not likely to yield the optimal 
location of the new forests and thus the highest social value for several reasons. Firstly, 
the government only buys (farm)land with low productivity that becomes available on the 
market, e.g. because of the retirement of its owner in the near future (so-called retired 
land). Secondly, subsidies are available for all landowners who meet the requirements and, 
for this reason, the regulator cannot predict who will use them. This undoubtedly shows 
that locational aspects are of minor importance. It implies that one already fairly wooded 
region could potentially increase its forest cover to a much higher extent than scarcely 
wooded areas, such as highly urbanized areas, with a high need of outdoor recreation 
opportunities. It could also imply the creation of multiple small forests of each only a few 
hectares and thus less interesting from both ecological and recreational point of view. 
Thirdly, the policy is likely to be expensive for the government. Finally, it is important to 
analyse the interactions between agricultural and afforestation policies since they are 
conflicting when pursuing a sustainable environmental policy. 
Since the optimality of the current policy is questionable, we suggest alternative policies 
and test these in a real life example. In our opinion, a first essential step in improving the 
Flemish afforestation policy is the selection of the optimal location of a set of new forests 
in Flanders. Forests do not stand on their own, they interact with their surroundings, both 
other nature or forest areas and their visitors. There exist only a limited number of studies 
dealing with these issues
3. 
                                                      
2 Belgium as a federal state consists of three regions: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Capital. 
3 See e.g. Van Elegem et al. (2002) and Moons et al. (2005)   3
Once the optimal location of a set of new forests is found, we examine how the Flemish 
government can implement it. We investigate several different policy scenarios and check 
whether they can be used to yield the optimal location of forests. We also calculate the 
associated costs for farmers and government as well as net social benefits. 
Our results allow us to formulate policy recommendations and show that it is worthwhile 
to consider alternative policy instruments not previously used in Belgian legislation. For 
example, auctions for afforestation projects can be used to decrease the costs for the 
government associated with a subsidy system. 
In section two we describe the current afforestation policy in Flanders and explain the 
existing subsidy scheme in detail. In section three we look at the optimal forest policy, 
which consists of two steps: firstly, the determination of the optimal location of multiple 
simultaneous afforestation projects, and secondly, the selection of an efficient policy 
instrument. In section four and five, we illustrate the different policy options and compare 
them to the optimal and the current situation with a realistic example. 
 
2. CURRENT AFFORESTATION POLICY 
Over the years attention has grown for afforestation and reforestation in Flanders. The 
Flemish region is characterized by a low forest cover (< 10% of the land area) and a high 
population density index (approx. 400 inhabitants per km²). In Flanders, the Long-Term 
Regional Forest Plan
 4 assumes a forest cover of 12% by the year 2010 and an increase of 
1% every five years (up to a forest cover of 30% by the year 2100) (Afdeling Bos en 
Groen, 2003). These policy targets are very ambitious and are, therefore, unlikely to be 
met. The Land-use Structure Plan of Flanders
5 (LSP) has identified the policy options for 
the realisation of an ecological establishment of new forests or forest extensions of 10.000 
ha by 2007. The Flemish Government is assumed to take a leading role in the realization 
of this afforestation goal but local administrations and the private sector (agriculture and 
other) have responsibilities as well.  These are called the “three pillars” of the afforestation 
                                                      
4 The Long-Term Regional Forestry Plan is a sectorial plan, in which the basic framework of the regional 
afforestation policy is identified for the future. 
5 The Land-use Structure Plan of Flanders (1997) is a new instrument of the Flemish Government for 
sustainable land-use planning. The main goals of the plan are to improve the general quality of life in 
urbanized areas and to strengthen the open space structures. This plan will influence land-use planning for 
the next decade.   4
policy. In this paper, we only discuss subsidy schemes for private landowners, in 
particular farmers, and the purchasing policy of the Flemish government. 
Since the 10.000 ha goal was set, approx. 3665 ha of existing forest land has been 
deforested, which increases the actual goal to almost 13.700 ha of forests to be created.  
The Land-use Structure Plan of Flanders does not give any guidelines as to the exact 
location of the new forests. On the qualitative level, the LSP indicates that ecological 
forest extension should primarily be realized close to existing forests, as a buffer (e.g. 
between a residential area and an industry zone), or in view of nature development or 
proximity of urban areas serving as many potential recreationists as possible
6. 
The Flemish Government arranges local studies that are to be conducted in order to select 
feasible and suitable locations. The current policy to extend existing forests and create 
new woodland relies heavily on subsidy schemes and land purchases in order to realise its 
policy goals. Moreover, present policy studies are performed on a small scale, i.e. for one 
single site, and do not consider spatial interactions between the studied areas. 
In reality the implementation of the Flemish forest policy happens at a very slow rate and 
the policy targets are not being met in time
7. One possible explanation can be found in 
Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997). These authors state that farmers in the 
EU have proved to be reluctant to participate in conservation programs, such as 
afforestation programs, because they fear that the government will not allow them to alter 
the management changes after the contracts have expired. 
 
2.1 Subsidy schemes for private landowners 
In order to implement European directives, the Flemish government worked out a subsidy 
scheme for the afforestation of farmland. Within the framework of the EU Council 
Regulation No 1257/99 on the support for rural development, support may be granted to 
private persons (both farmers and other) or administrations.  
                                                      
6 It is assumed that – in view of the recreational function of a forest – 1 ha of woodland is needed per 100 
inhabitants. 
7 See e.g. the fact that over the past 10 years, the area of forest land has decreased instead of increased.   5
We discuss in detail the subsidies available
8 for the afforestation of farmland and refer to 
appendix 1 for the subsidies for private forest owners and administrations.  
The conditions that need to be fulfilled for a Flemish farmer to apply for a subsidy are: 
-  the parcel of land should be exploited as farmland in the 5 years prior to the 
application for subsidies 
-  at least 0.5 ha of farmland should be forested 
-  the land cannot be deforested (if a multifunctional forest was planted) for at 
least 25 years; afterwards the land can only be deforested within the 
stipulations of the Forest Decree (‘Bosdecreet’ of 13 June 1990) 
-  plantings of poplar should remain for at least 15 years; afterwards the land can 
be re-used for farming without any further conditions. 
A summary of afforestation subsidies for farmers is given in Table 1. We make a 
distinction between poplar, deciduous and coniferous trees.  
Table 1: Subsidies for afforestation of farmland (per ha and per year unless mentioned otherwise) 
  Poplar  Deciduous trees  Coniferous trees 
Planting:     
basic subsidy  850 Euro  1500
9-3700
10 Euro  1000 Euro 
undergrowth  500 Euro  500 Euro  500 Euro 
border (bushes or 
deciduous trees) 
100Euro/100m 100€/100m  100  Euro/100  m 
Maintenance  1100 Euro  1750 Euro  875 Euro 
Supplement 1:  
land in forest or 
forest extension area  




250 Euro  250 Euro  250 Euro 
Income 
compensation 
375 Euro for 5 years  500 Euro for 20 
years for native tree 
species, 375 Euro 
for 5 years otherwise
375 Euro for 5 years 
Legend: All figures are lump-sum subsidies per hectare unless mentioned otherwise 
                                                      
8 Afdeling Bos en Groen (2003). 
9 Wallnut, false Acacia, American Oak, sweet Chestnut. 
10 Summer Oak, Winter Oak; for other native deciduous tree species one receives 2000, 2500 or 3000 €/ha. 
For a complete list see Afdeling Bos en Groen (2003).   6
Non-farmers who own farmland receive the same amounts of aid except for the income 
compensation. This is limited to 175 Euro/ha/year for 5 years in case of poplar, coniferous 
and non-native deciduous trees and the same amount for 15 years for other species. 
 
2.2 Purchasing policy of the Flemish Government 
Forest purchases within the next 40 years (realization horizon 2040) will take place within 
the framework of the Long-Term Regional Forest Plan. The goals of this plan are 
represented by several purchase perimeters that guarantee spatial spreading in such a way 
that social and ecological goals will be met.   
The purchase policy aims at extending the forest area in Flanders by 25000 ha, or an 
average of 625 ha per year. Forests are only purchased by the Flemish Government when 
a substantial surplus value is created. In other cases a stimulating policy (via subsidies) 
rather than a purchasing policy is preferred. Purchasing of land currently used by 
(economically) sound farms is avoided.  
 
3. OPTIMAL FOREST POLICY  
We want to evaluate the current afforestation policy in Flanders and determine how it can 
be changed in order to improve welfare. To this end we will need to determine the optimal 
location of the new forests. Further, in order to achieve this optimal location of forests the 
regulator needs to implement the policy and select the most cost effective instrument. The 
simplest solution, telling the landowners of the optimal sites to plant forests or face heavy 
penalties, is not a realistic option in a democratic country. For this reason, we examine 
several other policy options
11. First, however, we formally describe the decision process of 
landowners and government. 
 
                                                      
11 In France forest owners benefit from several tax exemptions and tax allowances (Stenger and Montagné, 
2004). For example, young forested areas are temporarily exempted of land tax and the owner’s taxable 
profit is reduced. We, however, do not consider tax incentives and exemptions. After all, according to 
McCarthy et al. (2003) tax incentives do not significantly influence the private forestation decision in 
Northern Ireland. A possible explanation, according to the authors, is that private forestry in Northern 
Ireland is dominated by small-scale planters who are unlikely to have significant tax liabilities. Since the 
same description of private forestry can be applied to Flanders, we do not consider this policy option.   7
3.1 Decision behaviour of landowners and government 
We assume that each plot of land is owned by one farmer and that land use decisions 
concern the complete plot as a whole. 
 
3.1.1 Landowners (farmers) 
In order to clearly understand the reaction of landowners to specific policies, we explicitly 
model their decision process. We assume that decisions j on land use   
( ) 0; 1 ; 2 j foragriculture j fora multifunctional forest j for a poplar forest == =  are 
made in order to maximise the farmers’ income  ij Y obtained from the land parcel i under 
consideration. This income can differ for each plot depending on its characteristics and its 
landowner, and it consists of the sum of expected income from agriculture ()
a
ij Y , 
agricultural subsidies ()
agr
ij s , afforestation subsidies ( )
for
ij s , income from hunting ()
h
ij Y  
and timber ()
t
ij Y , reduced by the manure disposal costs ( )
m
ij C , planting and management 
costs ()
p
ij C  and taxes () ij t . Formally the objective function of the owner of plot i is: 
 max
aa g r f o r h t m p
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij j YYs s YYCCt =+ + ++−−−  (1) 
 
3.1.2 Government 
The government wants to maximise the net social benefit accruing from land-use in the 
region. Social benefit consists of three terms: the income to landowners, the value of the 
land to society and the cost of financing the chosen policy. The regulator chooses the 
optimal land use for each plot, i.e.  ( ) 1if landuse onplot ;else 0 ij xj i = =  is selected in 
order to maximise 
 
R E NU agr for
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
ii i
Yx x V V V M C P F x t s s
     ++ + + − −        ∑∑ ∑  
 












 (2)   8
with 
R
ij V  the recreation value of plot i under land use j, 
E
ij V  the ecosystem value of plot i 
under land use j, 
NU
ij V  the non-use value of plot i under land use j, MCPF the marginal cost 
of public funds
12 and  i A  the surface area of plot i. The government is bound by an area 
restriction: only combinations which yield a wooded area of at least 150 hectares and at 
most 200 hectares are considered. The second restriction to the optimisation problem (2) 
specifies that each parcel of land can only have one type of use. 
 
3.2 Policy options 
In this section we consecutively discuss six possible policies for afforestation in Flanders. 
 
Option 1: purchasing policy through expropriation  
The government could decide to acquire the parcels in the optimal combination through 
expropriation. This would allow the government to achieve the desired policy goal at 
reasonable costs and within a short time span. The government would then become the 
owner and manager of the newly created forests. Expropriation in Flanders is, however, 
only possible if it has a social benefit and if the owner is reasonably compensated. This 
implies that a new piece of legislation is needed that states that ‘creating new forests has a 
social benefit’. This scenario is very unlikely due to the high political costs. 
 
Option 2: purchasing policy at market prices 
More realistically, we now suppose that whenever pieces of land specified in the optimal 
location are put up for sale, the government buys them. This can be realised by a system 
including rights of first purchase. A right of first purchase implies that the Flemish 
government can buy parcels of land, which are put up for sale, instead of the highest 
bidder. This only happens on condition that there are no other rights of first purchase. The 
rights of first purchase of a tenant or a land consolidation committee always have priority. 
                                                      
12 The marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) is a measure of the distortions caused by the collection of tax 
revenue. Each euro of collected taxes leads to a direct cost for the taxpayers (that one euro) as well as an 
indirect cost due to the less efficient functioning of the economy. After all, the transfer of resources from 
taxpayers to government alters the decision process of these taxpayers (e.g. consumption and labour 
decisions) and influences market behaviour.   9
Notary’s offices are obliged to give the Flemish government the opportunity to employ its 
right of first purchase. The government buys the land instead of the highest bidder at the 
price and conditions specified by this potential buyer. 
In order to obtain the optimal location of forest, the government should only buy land that 
is part of the optimal combination. This implies that the government needs to wait until 
these parcels of land are put up for sale by their current owners. Obviously, it can take a 
very long time to optimally create forests using this instrument. It is also a rather 
expensive way of acquiring the desired forests since the government needs to pay the 
market price. Moreover, the government becomes owner of the lands and needs to manage 
and maintain them. 
 
Option 3: subsidies for specific locations 
Can the government decide to only subsidise forests planted at the optimal locations? 
Subsidies are only legally binding when written down in a law, which determines the 
necessary requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to apply for the subsidy. These 
conditions need to be objective criteria and citizens who meet them cannot be excluded 
arbitrarily (discrimination principle). It is, nonetheless, possible to specify a total budget 
and work on a ‘first come, first serve’ basis. 
The government can, however, specify the criteria for subsidies for afforestation with the 
view of matching the optimal location as closely as possible. For this reason, it is 
interesting to look closely at the optimal allocation and find which factors (population 
density, distance to other forest, soil conditions, type of farm…) drive the results. Anthon 
and Thorsen (2004), for example, state that subsidy schemes should include afforestation 
alternatives, which differ in quality, since landowners derive different private benefits 
from the environmental goods produced by afforestation. They suggest including one 
alternative with low establishing costs and little focus on environmental goods and another 
type of projects with considerable focus on environmental goods and higher establishing 
costs. 
McCarthy et al. (2003) note that upfront payments paid in the early years of planting may 
be both a persuasive and cost efficient method of increasing the level of private forestry   10
planting. This is because the planter receives the payments immediately and they do not 
suffer from any risk of changes in government policy or from devaluation due to inflation. 
 
Option 4: Subsidy scheme combined with land purchases 
Mimicking the current afforestation policy in Flanders, the government could also decide 
to combine the subsidy scheme for specific locations with a purchasing policy. This would 
provide the option to buy certain parcels of land and convert them to forests, if the current 
landowners are unwilling to use the subsidies provided. We assume that the government 
would pay market prices and that potential sellers are not actively sought after and 
contacted. 
 
Option 5: revenue-neutral subsidy and tax scheme 
The Flemish government can also adopt a scheme that combines subsidies with taxes. This 
would allow the government to develop a revenue neutral afforestation policy. They can 
provide a subsidy to the farmer who decides to plant a forest on his/her land. If the land is 
used for agriculture, then the farmer has to pay a tax proportional to the number of acres 
that were not forested. Instead of a tax, the government could also decide to reduce the 
subsidy given for agricultural crops. The thresholds, above which a subsidy can be 
received, can depend on various factors such as the distance to existing forests or the soil 
type. These criteria have to be objective and non-discriminatory. Using this policy would 
reduce the costs to the government substantially because it also receives tax revenues (or a 
decrease in the budget for agricultural subsidies).  
Formally we have, on the one hand, if the farmer decides not to plant a forest, a tax  0 i t  
must be paid. On the other hand, if a forest is planted, a subsidy  1
for
i s  is granted. We also 
assume that  100
for
ii ts == . In order to obtain the optimal location of forests, the following 








Y t Y s if optimallocation
Y t Y s if non optimallocation
−≤ +
−> + −
 (3)   11
with 
agr
i Y net income if the land is used for agriculture ( ) 00 0 0
agr a agr h m
ii i i i YY s Y C =+ +−  and 
for
i Y  net income if a forest is planted ( ) 111 1
for h t m p
ii i i i YY Y C C =+−− . A possible solution for 
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It is only possible to obtain these tax and subsidy rates if the optimal parcels are 
distinguishable from non-optimal parcels using objective criteria. 
 
Option 6: auctions 
Auctions are a method frequently used in procuring commodities for which there are no 
well-established markets. Auctions are of particular interest for conservation contracting 
for at least two reasons (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997). First, the item 
being traded, the provision of environmental benefits, is a public-type non-market good 
which has no standard value. Second, there is a clear presence of information asymmetry 
in that the farmers know better than the program administrator how participation would 
affect their production plans and profits. Also the administrator has better knowledge 
about the optimal location of new forests and their value to society. Auctions in this 
respect enable the participants to reduce the uncertainty about the object being sold or 
purchased. 
Auctions designed to award contracts for nature conservation or afforestation typically 
involve multiple identical contracts. For multiple contracts a discriminatory first-price 
sealed bid auction can be used (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997). This 
implies that the n lowest bidders are rewarded and receive payment stated in their bids. In 
the case with no budget constraints, optimal auction design also requires the use of a 
reserve price (i.e. a maximal acceptable bid) to induce farmers to reveal their bids 
truthfully (Myerson, 1981 and Riley and Samuelson, 1981).  
We further assume that bidders are risk neutral and that bidders have independent private 
values, i.e. farmers know how the contract would affect their profits. Since the quality of   12
the land and thus the environmental services can differ between farmers, we have an 
asymmetric bidding situation. Practically this can be solved by discrimination between 
bids or using eligibility criteria. Further we assume that the payment is a function of bids 
alone and that part of the payments are made when the contracts are assigned and the rest 
is paid at the end of the program. Finally, since information costs can be important for the 
bidders and influence their bidding behaviour, it is important to promote the clarity and 
simplicity of the contracts and bidding process. (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
Hamsvoort, 1997).   
A real life example is the US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) that pays farmers to 
remove land from production and put it to a conservation use (Vukina et al., 2000). 
Farmers wishing to participate bid
13 the price per acre they will receive if accepted into the 
program. In addition, an environmental score is computed which attempts to measure the 
potential environmental benefits of idling the offered parcel which depend on 
environmental attributes such as wildlife habitat, water quality or soil erosion reduction. 
This score is then combined with the farmer’s bid to obtain an index which provides the 
ranking used to decide who can participate in the program. The US CRP also places an 
upper limit (cap) on acceptable bids, i.e. the average land rental rate for each soil type in 
the county where the proposed CRP land is located, plus a $5 per acre maintenance 
allowance. 
Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) show that auction schemes are more 
efficient than a fixed-rate offer (i.e. subsidy scheme). Under all bidding scenarios 
considered, more of the program goals were achieved with the same amount of money. 
The reasons for these efficiency gains are twofold. First, the difference between payments 
and costs accruing to farmers who enrol land with lower-than-average opportunity costs 
are reduced. Second, producers with opportunity costs above the level of the fixed-rate 
payment are encouraged to tender cost-covering bids. These farmers would not participate 
under the offer or subsidy system.     
 
                                                      
13 The bid consists of the annual rental fee plus a one-time cost share payment to partially offset the cost of 
conservation practices promised to install. The contract is generally for 10 to 15 years. During announced 
sign-up periods farmers can offer bids to place their land into the program. There are restrictions on 
qualifying land and on the total acreage that could be accepted into the program. (Vukina et al., 2000)   13
4. ILLUSTRATION  
In order to improve the current afforestation policy we use a real-life example of 
afforestation in Flanders (Belgium). We first determine the optimal location of a set of 
new forests given certain area constrictions. We compute net social benefit for each set of 
forests. In section 5 we examine the different policy options given this optimally located 
forest set and analyse their impact on the farmers, the government and consumers. This 
allows us to formulate several policy recommendations. 
 
4.1 Calculation of the optimal combination of potential new forests 
 
4.1.1 Methodology 
We calculate the social benefit (equation (2)) for all possible combinations of the potential 
forest sites. All combinations of two to seven potential new forest sites with a total surface 
area of 150 to 200 ha were taken into account. Since we need to value several non-existing 
forests simultaneously, we rely to a great extend on GIS (Geographical Information 
Systems). The advantage is that the methodology can be readily applied to other real-life 
examples. 
All costs and benefits for all parties – landowners, society and government - involved and 
for all three types of land use are calculated as annuities over a period of 150 years, since 
this is the normal rotation cycle for multifunctional forests (Garcia Quijano et al., 2005). 
All figures are in EURO 2000 and we use a discount rate of 2.5%. 
Most costs and benefits, such as planting and management costs, timber, hunting, carbon 
sequestration, ecological and non-use values, are assumed to be fixed amounts per hectare 
of land
14. They are independent both of the precise location of the site itself and of the 
location of its substitutes or important population centres. Farmers’ net incomes as well as 
manure deposition costs are site- and combination-dependent. We assume, however, a 
fixed amount for the recreation, ecological and non-use values of agricultural land and 
poplar plantings. Values are derived (or transferred) from relevant Flemish studies where 
possible.  
                                                      
14 Ideally, these costs and benefits would also be site-specific.   14
Recreation in multiple purpose forests is the only benefit category that is assumed to be 
dependent on the location of the forest, on the location of its substitutes, which can be 
both existing and other new forests, and on the regional population density. Under these 
conditions, a value function transfer rather than an “average benefit” transfer is preferred. 
This type of value function transfer for forest recreation was first developed by Lovett et 
al. (1997), Bateman et al. (1998), Bateman et al. (1999) and Brainard et al. (1999). The 
authors rely to a great extent on GIS. Whereas these studies perform a value function 
transfer for one single forest, Moons et al. (2005) developed a GIS-based methodology to 
perform a value function transfer in case one single potential – but currently non-existing 
– forest site belongs to a “set” of sites that meets certain restrictions on the total area of 
new forest land. The methodology used by Moons et al. (2005) was adapted to answer the 
current research questions. The base site is the Meerdaalwoud-Heverleebos (MW-HB) 
complex (1890 ha), the only forest in Flanders for which a recreation value study has been 
conducted (Moons et al., 2000). This forest complex is situated approximately 25 km east 
of Brussels, the capital of Belgium.  
We would like to add that the results might change with different surface constraints due 
to decreasing returns to scale (especially for recreation values) and increasing opportunity 
costs of agriculture (when a minimum level of self-support is not met). 
 
4.1.2 Benchmark 
The study area in this paper is Wetteren-Aalst, a suburban region in Flanders with a low 
forest index. Ten agricultural sites are marked as potential locations for new forests. For 
reasons of convenience we assume that the ten sites are each owned by one single farmer
15 
and that decisions on land use change apply to the site in its entirety. The farmer might 
have farmland on other locations or might have cowsheds, sties or folds that are not 
affected by the afforestation of the farmland in our dataset. Two soil types are present in 
our dataset: loam and sand-loam. For more information on these sites see Appendices 2 
and 3. 
As all new forests will be planted on current agricultural land, net social benefits of either 
poplar or multifunctional forests need to be compared with the value of the current 
                                                      
15 This is a reasonable assumption since the average farm size in the province of East Flanders is approx. 30-
40 ha.   15
agricultural use of the land. The agricultural sector in East Flanders produces a wide range 
of agricultural products (various crops along cattle for dairy and meat production, 
especially pigs). Three branches of agriculture are present in our dataset: crop farms, crop 
combined with pig farms, and crop combined with grazer (excl. dairy cows) farms. For 
ease of exposition we use the terms pig farms and grazer farms for the last two categories 
in the remainder of the text. Net income differs substantially according to the branch of 
agriculture a site currently belongs to
16. Crop farms create the highest yearly net income 
(646.51 Euro/ha), followed by pigs (549.33 Euro/ha) and grazers (472.98 Euro/ha). The 
net income includes agricultural subsidies and excludes taxes. Manure costs were 
subtracted. 
Excessive manure production is a serious environmental problem in a densely populated 
area such as Flanders. Use of the soil for agricultural production allows – limited - spread 
of manure on the agricultural land. Manure norms have become more stringent over the 
last decades. Norms for nitrogen and phosphate differ per parcel of land in function of soil 
type, as well as protection laws for area and ground water and type of crop.  
For this reason we model in a detailed way the manner in which the farmers dispose of the 
manure produced. We assume that grazer farms are able to spread their manure completely 
on their own land. Their cost of manure deposition is therefore assumed to be zero. Crop 
farms do not produce any manure. Pig farms, in contrast, cannot spread all produced 
manure on their own land. We assume that they have an agreement with crop farms and 
that they can spread their excess manure on crop land. The cost associated with spreading 
fertilizer on crop land equals the transportation cost and we assume that the cost of one 
trip by tractor of 10 tonne manure equals 12.01 Euro
17.  
We assume that, when the farmland is afforested, farmers loose all of their income from 
agriculture from that piece of land. As other parcels of farmland or stables owned by the 
farmer are unaffected, part of the farmers’ income will be preserved. Manure produced by 
the grazers and pigs is spread on remaining agricultural land or disposed of in an 
alternative way, both of which are costly. If farmers are no longer able to spread their 
manure on land (at a cost of 1.2 Euro/tonne) due to afforestation, the cost of industrial 
                                                      
16 See Centrum voor Landbouweconomie (2001). 
17 We assume that the fuel use of a tractor is 0.5 liter per km (Rathwell et al., 2000), that the price of diesel is 
0.3 Euro/l, that the other costs equal 1.05 Euro/l (Rathwell et al., 2000) and that the average trip is 10 km.     16
processing equals 12.39 Euro/tonne. Including the processing of manure into the model, 
implies that the farmers’ afforestation decisions cannot be examined independently of 
each other. If crop farmers decide to plant trees on their land, then there will be less land 
available for spreading the pig manure and pig farmers will have to dispose of their 
manure in another, more costly, way. Since crop farmers do not consider this externality 
when deciding on land use, their decisions are not always socially optimal. If the site is 
afforested, regardless of the tree types, a farmer’s income will depend highly on which 
other sites are afforested. It might even become negative. The lowest (highest) net 
farmer’s income is -4737.88 (544.11) Euro/ha/year for a pig farm, -1259.40 (472.98) for a 
grazer farm and -364.40 (646.51) for a crop farm. The net income of a crop farmer is 
always a fixed amount per hectare as he does not have any manure to dispose of.  
Besides agricultural products, agrarian land produces non-tangible benefits such as 
recreation, hunting, carbon sequestration, non-use and ecological values. Hunting values 
for agrarian land are assumed to be half of the value for multifunctional forests and 
amount to 7.69 Euro/ha/year (Moons et al., 2000). Carbon uptake was simulated for 
agricultural land by Garcia Quijano et al. (2005). As agriculture serves as the benchmark 
land use, we assume a zero value for carbon sequestration. For data on recreation, non-use 
and ecological values of agrarian land, very few sources are available. We use data from a 
Swedish contingent valuation study from 1992 (Drake, 1992). He studies open and varied 
agrarian landscapes and finds an annual value of 193.14 Euro per hectare for recreation, 
non-use and ecological values combined
18.   
A detailed data-overview is given in Appendix 4. 
 
4.1.3 Alternative land uses 
We discuss two land use scenarios: firstly the farmer plants a poplar forests or secondly, a 
multifunctional forest is planted. 
Alternative land use 1: poplar forests 
A site is planted with the best available poplar (Populus L.) clones and managed according 
to the best available management scheme (see also Garcia Quijano et al., 2005). We 
                                                      
18 Annuity, Euro 2000.   17
assume a 25-year rotation cycle. After 25 years, stumps are removed and the plantation is 
re-established. For reasons of comparability, we assume six consecutive rotations with a 
total duration of 150 years.  
Depending on the afforestation policy scheme, the farmer either receives a subsidy for 
afforesting the land himself or he sells it to the government. In the latter case, the 
government is responsible for all costs and entitled to all future yields, in the former case 
both costs and yields accrue to the farmer who is still the landowner. 
Timber yields depend on the type of soil. On average timber yields amount to approx. 202 
Euro/ha/year (Garcia Quijano et al., 2005). Other types of (non-tangible) benefits 
produced by poplar forests include hunting (7.69 Euro/ha/year) (Moons et al., 2000), 
recreation, non-use and ecological values (320.38 Euro/ha/year) (Drake et al., 1992). The 
value per tonne of carbon sequestered is estimated at 10 Euro (CIEMAT, 1999). For a 
total of 29.16 tonne of carbon sequestered per hectare (Garcia Quijano et al., 2005), this 
amounts to 291.6 Euro/ha/year. Planting and management costs accrue to 99.19 
Euro/ha/year (Garcia Quijano et al., 2005).  
A detailed data-overview is given in appendix 5. 
Alternative land use 2: sustainable multifunctional forest 
A sustainable managed multifunctional forest is a forest where wood production is 
combined with high ecological and recreational values, characterized by long rotations 
(i.e. 150 years), managed with a thinning frequency of 10 years and regenerated with a 
group selection system (Garcia Quijano et al., 2005).  We assume a former agricultural 
site is planted with a mixed oak-beech forest, both native tree types. Thinnings in 
oak/beech begin at age 40 with a frequency of 10 years. Final harvesting takes place in the 
year 150. Timber yields as well as the sale of (small game) hunting permits are benefits 
accruing to the landowner. Other non-tangible benefits include carbon sequestration, other 
ecological values, non-use values and recreation.   
Timber yield accrues to 5 Euro/ha/year on average (Garcia Quijano et al., 2005). These 
values are much lower than for poplar plantings as harvesting takes place at a later point in 
time. Hunting values for multifunctional forests are twice the value for poplar plantings 
(15.38 Euro/ha/year; Moons et al., 2000). Carbon sequestration values amounts to 68.8   18
Euro/ha/year (or 6.88 tonnes of carbon valued at 10 Euro/tonne; Garcia Quijano et al., 
2005 and CIEMAT, 1999), other ecological values amount to 51.96 Euro/ha/year (Garrod 
and Willis, 1997) and non-use values are estimated at 3860 Euro/ha/year (Moons et al., 
2005). The average
19 recreation value for each of our ten study sites varies from 314.19 to 
2268.26 Euro/ha/year. These are average figures as the exact recreation value per forest 
depends on the combination of forests it belongs to. 
Planting and Management costs are assumed to be 24.16 Euro/ha/year (Garcia Quijano et 
al., 2005). This number is quite high compared to timber yield which can be explained by 
the difference in timing these costs and benefits appear. Costs are high at the beginning of 
a rotation, benefits are high at the end of a rotation. 
For a detailed data-overview see Appendix 6. 
 
4.2 Solution 
Applying the methodology explained in section 4.1.1 combined with the data from 
sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, we find that the optimal combination of new forests consists of 
sites 1, 2, 9 and 10.  
Sites 1, 9 and 10 are currently used for crop farming whereas site 2 is used for grazing. 
Site 2 is the largest in terms of surface area (64 ha), while site 9 measures only 22 ha. 
Population density around sites 1 and 2 is higher than the average for Flanders, sites 9 and 
10 are situated in far less densely populated areas. For more information on these sites see 
Appendix 3. Their geographic location is marked on the provincial map in appendix 2. 
 
5. RESULTS 
In this section we start by looking at the differences in social welfare between the current 
subsidy policy and the optimal command-and-control (CAC) policy 
20. Secondly, we 
consider several policy options to implement the optimal combination of forests. Finally, 
we investigate what happens if transfers between agents are no longer costless. 
                                                      
19 Average over all combinations a particular site belongs to. 
20 This command-and-control policy implies that the government orders the farmers belonging to the optimal 
combination to plant multifunctional forests on their plots and the farmers fully comply. The farmers are still 
the owners of the land and are responsible for all planting and management costs without any compensation 
from the government.   19
5.1 Current subsidy policy versus optimal CAC policy 
First we apply the current Flemish subsidy scheme to our benchmark and observe which 
farmers will participate. For the specified subsidy amounts farmers 1, 9 and 10 decide to 
plant forests. If the current Flemish subsidy scheme is imposed, then social welfare (see 
equation (2) with  1 765€/
for
i sh a =  and  00 1 0
for
ii i st t = == ) increases with 881  968 Euro 
compared to not having a Flemish afforestation policy (see figure 1). The optimal policy 
() 10 0 1 0
for for
ii i i withs s t t == = = , which ensures that the new cluster of forests is planted at its 
optimal location, increases social welfare by 220 102 Euro, i.e. 25 percent. This implies 
that the current afforestation policy in Flanders is not optimal and that there is room for 
improvement. 




Net social benefit (in thousand Euro)
 
Figure 1: Net social benefit of current subsidy and optimal CAC policy 
In order to identify the possibilities for policy reform, we look more closely at the 
differences between current subsidy and optimal CAC policy in table 2. The current 
subsidy amount, if we model the landowner’s behaviour as in equation (1), induces only 
three (out of ten) farmers to plant forests while the optimal policy involves four 
landowners. Total net farmers’ income is negative due to the externalities caused by the 
manure disposition. Since all crop formers decide to plant forests, their land is no longer 
available for spreading manure produced by pig farmers. 
Surprisingly the optimal location of forests has a slightly lower recreational value to 
Flemish consumers than the present policy. However, the increase in non-use, ecological 
and carbon sequestration benefits compensates for the loss in recreational value under the 
optimal policy. Note that it is never socially optimal to plant poplar since these forests   20
have only a limited advantage over agriculture and have higher associated costs. The 
advantages of poplar plantings, however, may increase once their potential for substituting 
fossil fuel as a source for electricity production is fully acknowledged. 
 
Table 2: Comparison between current subsidy and optimal CAC afforestation policy 
  Current subsidy policy  Optimal CAC policy 
Forested area (in ha)  118  182 
Number of forests  3  
(1, 9 and 10) 
4 
(1,2,9 and 10) 
Type of forests  Multifunctional  Multifunctional 
Net farmers’ income (euro)   -13 716   -162 209 
Government revenue (euro)  -47 267  67 118 
Net recreational value (euro)  473 221  472 663 
Net non-use value + net ecological 
value + net carbon sequestration (euro) 
469 729  724 498 
 
5.2 Implementing the optimal CAC policy 
As we mentioned in section 3 it is not politically feasible in Flanders to dictate the 
landowners of the optimal parcels to plant forests. In order to obtain the optimal cluster of 
forests, we need regulation that respects the Belgian constitution and international 
agreements. To this end, we look at the different policy options that were previously 
discussed in section 3. We do not include option 1 since, as we mentioned before, 
expropriation is a highly unlikely scenario. If we look at the optimal location of new 
forests that was calculated in the section 4, we can construct an objective policy scheme to 
distinguish optimal and non-optimal parcels.  
 
Option 2: Government buys the land for the optimal location at market prices 
We assume that parcels are put on the market with an exogenous probability pi for parcel 
{ } 1,2,....10 i∈  (see Appendix 2). This probability is determined, among other things, by   21
the farmer’s need of cash, by retirements or inheritances. We assume that the price for a 
hectare of farmland in East Flanders is 25000 Euro
21. The government only buys parcels 
that belong to the optimal combination of forests. This implies that, in one period, the 
government has a probability of  1291 0 ... p ppp of acquiring the optimal location for the 
forest expansion. In the empirical exercise we choose the probabilities pi ad hoc and the 
probability that the optimal combination of plots is acquired by the Flemish government is 
zero for our example since we assume that parcel 10 is never put up for sale (see appendix 
2). This is an extreme result. More general we can say that using this purchasing policy 
does not guarantee that the optimal forest combination will be planted.  
 
Option 3: Subsidies for specific locations 
Given the optimal location of forests, the optimal subsidy policy is: 
  { } max
0
for agr for





with OPT the set of all parcels belonging to the optimal combination of new forests. In our 
illustration, the subsidy for optimal parcels is: 910.8 Euro/ha of multifunctional forest for 
crop farms and for farms with grazers. This subsidy scheme induces all crop farmers 
(farmers 1, 9 and 10) to plant a forest, while only one farmer with grazers (farmer 2) does 
so. The other two farmers with grazers (farmers 4 and 8) do not use the subsidy since they 
have more manure to dispose of. The optimal subsidy is almost 20 percent more than the 
current annualised subsidy of 765 Euro/ha (see table 1).  
 
Option 4: subsidy scheme combined with purchasing policy 
In this policy option we assume that the optimal subsidies from option 3 are 
complemented with a right of first purchase. We include this option in order to mimic the 
current Flemish afforestation policy, which includes both subsidies and purchases. 
Depending on the optimal subsidy amounts, it can be cheaper for the government to buy 
the land parcels at market prices if they are offered for sale. 
                                                      
21 This is the average of ten parcels of farmland put up for sale on the largest Belgian real estate website 
www.immoweb.be. We use the annuity of this value over 25 years at 2.5 %, i.e. 1357 Euro/ha.   22
Option 5: Revenue-neutral subsidy-tax scheme 
If we combine the optimal subsidy from option 3 with a revenue-neutral tax (or a 
reduction in subsidies) for farmers who continue with agriculture, six landowners (1, 2, 4, 
8, 9 and 10) would plant forests. This policy specification would, however, not satisfy our 
area constraint. The resulting forests would cover 243 ha (>200 ha). Therefore, we opt to 
offer a subsidy of 910.8 Euro/ha to crop farmers and a revenue-neutral tax of 324 Euro/ha 
for agricultural land users. This leads to the creation of three forests on land parcels 1, 9 
and 10. We are unable to find an objective criterion to induce farmer 2 to cease the 
agricultural use of its land while at the same time convincing farmers 4 and 8 to continue 
with agriculture. It appears to be impossible to obtain the optimal cluster of new forests 
using this policy option and this will lead to a lower net social benefit (see figure 2). 
 
Option 6: Auction 
In a discriminatory first-price sealed bid auction farmers can ask the amount of subsidies 
(=bid) they would like to receive for converting their farmland into forest. The regulator 
will need to set a reserve price (see section 3.2). After all bids are made, the regulator will 
calculate the optimal cluster of new forests and accept the bids of all landowners that 
belong to that optimal combination. The farmers do not know in advance the outcome of 
this optimisation exercise and assume that the probability distribution of winning the 
auction is equal for all participants. Calculating the optimal location of new forests implies 
that the government knows the costs and benefits of forestry and agriculture for the 
different farmers. Landowners, who ask more subsidies than necessary to cover the costs 
of conversion, will have a zero probability of having their bid accepted. Since it is 
irrational to bid less than the land conversion costs, farmers will in equilibrium bid 
precisely enough to cover their costs:  
 
agr for
ii i bY Y =− (6) 
These bids allow the government to reach the optimal combination of forests at a lower 
cost than with a subsidy scheme.  































































































































































Net social benefit (in thousand Euro) Forested area (in ha)
 
Figure 2: Comparison of the different policy options 
 
5.3 Costly transfers 
We were able to obtain the same level of social welfare with the policy options 3, 4 and 6 
as the optimal CAC policy (see figure 2). The reason behind this result is that subsidies 
and taxes are treated as costless transfers between different agents in the economy
22. We 
assume that the government can collect funds at zero cost, i.e. the marginal cost of public 
funds is equal to one. Obviously, when we relax this assumption and assume a marginal 
cost of public funds of 1.5, it becomes important how much a policy costs for the 
government. Policies that are costless or even raise revenues are preferable to more costly 
options (see figure 3). This implies that option 5, the subsidy-tax scheme, becomes more 
advantageous since it is designed as a revenue-neutral policy. However, if the government 
does not want to tax farmers and since the CAC policy is politically infeasible, the auction 
                                                      
22 We also do not consider the difference in rule making, implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs 
between the different policy instruments. By including these costs for the Flemish textile industry, Rousseau 
and Proost (forthcoming) show that emission standards can obtain a higher social welfare than emission 
taxes under certain circumstances. Since we have no reliable estimates of these costs for the current policy 
exercise, we were not able to include them.   24
policy is the best option. If the auction can be optimally designed, it can substantially 


































































Figure 3: Difference in net social benefit when the marginal cost of public funds is 1.5  
(compared to optimal CAC policy with MCPF = 1) 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Before deciding which afforestation policy will be developed it is welfare improving to 
calculate the optimal location of new forests. The analysis of the optimal location can 
provide the regulator with objective criteria, which can be used to implement an optimal 
policy. Currently, the Flemish government supposedly only buys land for forest expansion 
when a substantial surplus value is expected. However, an objective and clear definition of 
this substantial surplus value has not been incorporated in existing legislation. Our 
empirical illustration shows that the welfare gain is considerable if the afforestation 
subsidy is conditioned on an objective criterion rather than a case-by-case approach. 
The calculation of the optimal location of a cluster of forests rather than locating 
individual forests separately is essential when externalities and interdependencies are 
present. Recreation benefits, for example, differ according to the number of substitutes 
available and depend on the location of all newly planted forests. The problem of manure 
deposition can also lead to negative externalities if farmland is used to spread manure of   25
other farmers. The interactions between existing forests, new forests and agriculture need 
to be considered in order to correctly calculate the net social benefit of the afforestation 
policy. 
The current subsidy scheme stipulates a minimal area constraint of 0.5 ha. Since recreation 
seems to be a driving force in the Flemish afforestation policy and given its crucial role in 
selecting multiple forest combinations, forests should have a minimal area surface of 
several hectares. The recreation value of forests increases dramatically once a certain 
threshold of several hectares is crossed. Keeping this in mind, planting uniform poplar 
forests is by far less interesting than more complex forest structures. When designing a 
subsidy policy, the regulator should take the asymmetric timing of costs and benefits into 
account. The largest part of the cost burden falls at the beginning of the forest rotation 
whereas benefits only start to accrue after several years. The problem of the cost burden 
can be mitigated by upfront payments of subsidies. To fully capture the benefits, the 
current planning horizon of 25 years (for a deciduous forest) is rather short. Ideally, the 
government should consider the whole rotation cycle (of 150 years for a deciduous forest). 
It also seems worthwhile to consider auctions for afforestation contracts. This instrument 
has not been previously used in Flanders but it has proven its worth in the US 
Conservation Reserve Program. In order to reap the possible benefits, the auction needs to 
be adequately designed. 
Next we indicate several interesting paths for future research. First, the quality of the 
regulatory guidelines that stem from our illustration would improve by exploring a more 
diversified ecological value and its effects on the optimal policy as well as using more 
detailed information on farmers’ incomes and agricultural subsidies. Secondly, up to now 
we assumed that costs and benefits linearly increase with forest size. In reality advantages 
and disadvantages of scale and learning effects, among other things, determine the 
functional form of costs and benefits. Moreover, allowing farmers to partially convert 
farmland into woodland and making the analysis dynamic rather than static increases the 
flexibility of the conversion decision and hence the selection of the optimal location. 
Finally, extrapolating the results to larger regions, such as Flanders, is likely to make the 
identification of objective criteria for policy scenarios more complicated and less 
straightforward.   26
APPENDIX 1: Subsidies for private forest owners and administrations 
Private forest owners and administrations can apply for different types of subsidies. We 
discuss these consecutively. 
Subsidies for afforestation and reforestation 
Subsidies for afforestation and reforestation can be assigned both to private as well as 
public forests when native tree types are used. Poplar is excluded from the subsidy 
scheme. The minimal area is either 0.5 ha or smaller areas within less than 1 km distance. 
Clear cutting or changing the destination of the forest is forbidden for a period of 20 years. 
The subsidy amounts to 1500 to 3200 Euro per hectare depending on the tree type. 
Undergrowth gives right to an extra subsidy of 500 Euro per hectare and the use of 
recommended origin to a supplement of 250 Euro per hectare.  
Subsidies for opening private forests to the public 
Private forest owners/managers are entitled to a yearly subsidy of 2 Euro per meter of 
opened road, with a maximum of 50 Euro per ha and to a yearly subsidy of 1 Euro per ha 
playground. 
 Subsidy for ecological forest function 
Management plans that meet the criteria of sustainable forest management give right to an 
annual subsidy of 50 or 125 Euro per hectare. Clear cutting of large areas (larger than 1 
ha) is prohibited during a period of 10 years. 
Subsidy for maintenance plans according to criteria of sustainable forest management. 
Once every 20 years, both public and private forest owners can be granted this type of 
subsidy. The forest must be at least 5 ha and a maintenance plan has to be drafted. The 
amount varies from 200 to 250 Euro per hectare depending on the number of forests for 
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